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As a layman in the law and a student of things Chinese, I must confess that my major source of fascination with the 190 legal cases which
Professors Bodde and Morris have culled from a Chinese casebook
compilation containing well over 7,600 legal cases has been with the
enormous variety of social and cultural data which they contain. Here
we have a collection of tranches de vie based on undeniable actualities
which shed new light on every aspect of Chinese culture. Messrs. Bodde
and Morris have made a highly representative selection of cases, and
it is to their credit that what they provide simply whets our appetite
for more of the enormous material available. Like all forms of documentation, to be sure, this documentation may have its own problems
and inherent limitations, but henceforth it will no longer be possible
to ignore this source of evidence when making large generalizations
about "Traditional Chinese Society."
If the book has a much broader reference than the study of law as
a separate discipline, it is certainly a major landmark in the western
literature on Chinese law. To appreciate its value and scope, a brief
description of its contents is in order. The core of the book (Part 2) is
the collection of 190 cases translated from the Conspectus of Penal
Cases (Hsing-an Hui-Ian). The Conspectus is a private compilation of
cases drawn from the archives of the Board of Punishments by Chinese
legal scholars of the nineteenth century. The Conspectus proper was
compiled by Chu Ch'ing-ch'i and Pao Shu-yiin in 1834, and the work
was later augmented by two supplements the last of which is dated
1886. Drawn as they are from the archives of China's highest court
of appeal, these cases are all cases which have found their way to the
state's highest tribunal. They are thus cases which are problematic
and contradictory, and the motive for their compilation is undoubtedly
that stated by Professor Bodde, "to supply jurists with a body of precet Professor of History and Government, Harvard University.
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dents in readily accessible form."1 The translation of these cases was
hardly a routine undertaking given the enormous difficulties of the
technical language employed. Furthermore, Professor Bodde has copiously interlarded his translations with illuminating annotations which
render comprehensible circumstances which would appear entirely
baffling to the western reader.
The text itself is preceded by a lengthy and extraordinarily valuable
introduction (Part 1) on the whole subject of Chinese law. The section
on "basic concepts" summarizes some of the generally accepted views
on the nature and role of law in Chinese culture. I would like to record at this point a slight dissent from Professor Bodde's assertion that
the "continuing penal emphasis" in the imperial codes is due to "Legalist" influence. 2 While Legalism as an outlook has undoubtedly profoundly influenced the whole course of China's political development,
while the idea that every crime has its exactly fitting punishment may
owe something to Legalist "objectivism," the notion that the legal
sphere (the sphere of fa) is the realm in which the state maintains social order by the application of physical force is quite as Confucian as
it is Legalist. The most utopian variant of Confucianism may dream
of a society in which harmonious relations among men are maintained
wholly by the uncoerced obedience of the customary rules of morality
(1i), but other variants of Confucianism seem to accept the existence
of the principle of evil in human society which makes it regrettably
necessary to control certain elements of society and certain modes of
behavior through the use of physical force. To Confucius no less than
to the Legalist, the realm of litigation is the realm of brute force.
Other sections of the introduction, however, represent new contributions to the western literature on Chinese law. The section on
the organization and functioning of the Board of Punishments is most
illuminating, and the description of the Ch'ing legal code and of the
Chinese penal system provides the student with the most vivid and
succinct account of these matters which I have seen anywhere. Section
VI on the social and political implications of those cases touches, it
seems to me, on most of the important themes. It does, however, lead
to further questions which I would like to explore briefly below.
Professor Morris's juridical commentary in Part 3 is an excellent
and original discussion by an American legal scholar who, like Professor Jerome Cohen at the Harvard Law School, is able to bring to bear
his vast knowledge of the theory and practice of law in the United
States. His ability to compare the cases from the Conspectus with Lan1 P. 150.
2 P. 28.
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zetta v. New Jersey3 and State v. Provenzano4 introduces an entirely
new dimension into our discussion of these matters.
Finally, the painstaking care which Professor Bodde has lavished
on the compilation of appendices, glossary, and bibliography make this
work as a whole an entirely exceptional contribution to western scholarship. It is designed to be of equal value to the Chinese specialist and
to the student of comparative law.
Turning for a moment to the realm of law itself, one finds that
Professor Morris provides us with valuable correctives to some of our
accepted conventional wisdom on many matters. There is a widespread
impression that the traditional Chinese law was "judge's" law, that the
local magistrate was often able to decide cases on the basis of his own
judgment and sense of equity (or lack thereof) with little or infrequent
references to the codes. This judicial discretion was presumably based
on the Confucian view that one must rely ultimately on the judgment
of good men in dealing with the infinitely varied circumstances of life.
Professor Morris has convincingly demonstrated that at least on the
level of judicial review represented by the Board of Punishments every
effort was made to create a systematic, reasoned, and consistent structure of law and legal procedure. The feeling for the infinite variety
of circumstance and the aversion to generalized formulas is, to be sure,
present. From the western point of view, many of the statutes are almost ridiculously specific in reference. Yet every effort is made to
subsume new cases under existing statutes either directly or by "analogical" reasoning. When one realizes that an enormous proportion of
legal cases (e.g., all cases involving homicide) did come under review
in Peking, one feels obliged to modify some of our notions concerning
the legal powers of local judicial authorities.
On further reflection one tends to feel that this tendency toward
consistency and system was probably inherent in the whole centralized
bureaucratic system of legal institutions, and that here, as elsewhere
in the Chinese state, one finds that constant tension between the Confucian emphasis on personality and the systematizing and impersonalizing tendencies of centralized bureaucracy. To be sure, many of the
decisions made in Peking also seem to be based more on socio-ethical
considerations than on rigorously systematic legal reasoning (although
legal grounds are always found), but it is quite clear that the local
magistrate and even the provincial legal authorities operated (at least
during periods of stability) within a system whose severe constraints
they could not ignore.
3 306 U.S. 451 (1938). See pp. 530-33.
4 34 N.J. 318, 169 A.2d 135 (1961). See pp. 521-22.
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If the book modifies some of our notions about how the law itself
worked, it rather confirms our views about the place of law in the society as a whole. The magistrate's yamen is concerned above all with
the punishment of crimes, and the state itself is consciously bent on
making the realm of litigation a realm of dread and fear. "Litigation
tricksters" who use their literacy to act as informal lawyers are punished with amazing severity, and we have several incidents of the suicide
of persons who are driven to this recourse by the prospect of involvement in a legal case. Neither the good nor the circumspect would betake
themselves to the magistrate's yamen if they could possibly avoid it.
While the law was thus less arbitrary than we had supposed, while
every effort was made to have the punishment fit the crime, the aggregate picture which emerges both of the law and of the society which
became entangled with it, is somber and unflattering, at least to the
western eye. The idealized China of peace and social harmony is not
very much present in these pages. Everywhere we find the prevalence of
violence, suicide, and the cruel abuse of the privileges provided by the
law to those in authority, particularly parents and senior relatives. The
draconic nature of the punishments, as has often been pointed out,
is of course not so different from what prevailed elsewhere before the
rise of nineteenth century humanitarianism.
In all of this we are dealing not only with the usual discrepancy
between ideals and actualities. On the contrary, these cases confirm
the enormous impact of Confucian ideas and ideals on the fabric of
Chinese life. Everywhere we find evidence of the "Confusianization
of the law." Precisely because the family relationship is the sacrum
tremendum of Confucianism we find hierarchic family authority protected in law with a zeal which seems to us almost grotesque. From the
Confucian belief that family relations can easily be rendered benign
and harmonious, we arrive at a situation in which an adulterous father
who kills his protesting son escapes with an extraordinarily light punishment. Images of reality and ideals do affect life, but this is not
always a heartening fact. The fact that their effect is often quite far
from the intentions of the founding fathers is not due simply to the
unregenerate Adam but also to the blindspots and one-sided nature of
the ideals and images themselves.
The crucial question remains. If the 190 cases present a generally
sordid and dark picture (at least from our point of view), to what extent do they provide us with a picture of Chinese society "as it really
was?" Was traditional China a violent society (in comparison to others)?
Was the abuse of privileged family authority (as well as status positions
of all types) universally prevalent? Here we must take into account
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some of the inherent limitations of our data. Professor Bodde notes
that most of these cases belong to the early decades of the nineteenth
century which he describes as a period of "relative cultural and political stability." 5 Others would stress that this was a period of growing
demoralization and depression. Are we therefore dealing with perennial
China or with a particular historic moment? There is the further fact
that the 7,600 cases of the Conspectus are difficult and "interesting"
cases and that one would expect a relatively high proportion of "sensational" cases in such a collection. There is, above all, the fact already
stressed that by the very nature of the role of law courts in Chinese life,
the most sensationally seamy side of Chinese life was bound to occupy
a central place within the legal sphere.
We can thus not derive any statistically based conclusions about the
typicality of the varieties of experience found in these cases. They
certainly cancel out some sinophilic idealizations of Chinese society,
but one suspects that life in the average was no more like this than it
was like Voltaire's image of China. The "truth" about China is probably as complex and paradoxical as the truth everywhere.
5 P. 161.

